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Structural inﬂuences on involvement in European homegrown
jihadism: A case study
Bart Schuurman , Edwin Bakker , and Quirine Eijkman
Institute of Security and Global Aﬀairs, Leiden University, The Hague, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article empirically assesses the applicability of structural-level
hypotheses for involvement in terrorism within the context of European
homegrown jihadism. It uses these hypotheses to study how structural
factors inﬂuenced involvement in the Dutch “Hofstadgroup.” Structural
factors enabled the group’s emergence and its participants’ adoption of
extremist views. They alsomotivated involvement in political violence and
a shift in someparticipants’ focus from joining Islamist insurgents overseas
to committing terrorism in the Netherlands. Finally, structural factors
precipitated an actual terrorist attack. No support is found for the
frequently encountered argument that discrimination and exclusion
drive involvement in European homegrown jihadism. Instead, geopolitical
grievances were prime drivers of this process.
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Introduction
In November 2004, a participant in the Dutch homegrown1 jihadist “Hofstadgroup”
murdered the controversial ﬁlmmaker Theo van Gogh. Arrests revealed a group of
approximately 40 people, centered on an inner circle of Salaﬁ-Jihadist2 militants, some
of whom appeared to be planning further acts of terrorism.3 Using new primary-sources
based data, this article presents a qualitative analysis of the role that structural-level factors
played in bringing about involvement in the Hofstadgroup. The results underline their
role in providing motives, opportunities, and triggers for involvement in terrorist groups
and terrorist violence. Additionally, they add to a growing body of literature that questions
whether involvement in homegrown jihadism stems from socioeconomic inequality or
discrimination. Instead they point to the key role played by geopolitical grievances.
Numerous hypotheses exist for involvement in terrorism that are rooted in structural-
level factors. But owing to the long-standing scarcity of primary-sources based data in the
study of terrorism, few publications empirically ascertain their validity.4 This problem is
reﬂected in the literature that focuses speciﬁcally on European homegrown jihadism.
Although numerous authors have looked at the inﬂuence of structural-level factors on
this form of violent extremism, these analyses are largely based on secondary sources.5 As
King and Taylor wrote in 2011, “empirical veriﬁcation of the existing assumptions
surrounding the process leading up to terrorism should take precedence over additional
theorizing.”6 This article contributes to a more empirically substantiated understanding of
the roles that structural-level factors play in bringing about involvement in European
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homegrown jihadism. It does so by utilizing extensive and unique primary-sources based
data on a key example of this typology: namely, the Dutch Hofstadgroup.
Single case study research designs cannot, of course, sustain broad generalizations about
how structural-level factors inﬂuence involvement in European homegrown jihadism.
But they can provide empirical evidence relevant to the conﬁrmation or refutation of
structural-level hypotheses for such involvement. Thus the present article can function as
a step toward a more empirically robust understanding of the roles that structural-level
factors play in initiating and sustaining participation in European homegrown jihadist
terrorism. Hopefully, these ﬁndings will ultimately contribute to the veriﬁcation of existing
assumptions that is at present too frequently missing.
To be clear, structural-level factors are not seen as a special category of explanatory
variables. Factors such as poverty or inequality do not warrant the “root causes” label
politicians are still apt to apply to them.7 A comprehensive understanding of involvement
in terrorism requires that the structural-level perspective be complemented by group- and
individual-level analyses. In his PhD thesis, the ﬁrst authormakes such an attempt by studying
involvement in the Hofstadgroup from structural-, group-, and individual-level perspectives.
Because of its size, that analysis cannot be compressed in its entirety into an article without
losing a considerable amount of detail and nuance. Instead, the following pages focus
exclusively on the structural level of analysis while emphasizing that this is but one of several
perspectives from which to study involvement in homegrown jihadist terrorism.
A structural-level perspective on involvement in terrorism
Students of terrorism8 frequently distinguish between micro-, meso-, and macro-level
analyses, generally translating them respectively into a focus on the individual, the group,
and the structural conditions in which they operate.9 Factors inﬂuencing involvement
in terrorism are understood to be structural when they relate to the social, cultural,
economic, or (geo)political environment in which people live.10 Examples include
widespread poverty, profound social inequality, war, or regional instability and lack of
political freedoms.11 Structural factors can also take the form of speciﬁc events which
decisively shape individuals’ immediate surroundings, such as a government’s sudden and
violent crackdown on a protest. Essentially, structural-level factors can be conducive to
involvement in terrorism in three ways; by enabling or motivating involvement or by
supplying triggers that lead to the commission of an act of terrorism.
This tripartite distinction is based on Crenshaw’s classic work on the causes of terrorism.
It distinguishes between “preconditions, factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long
run, and precipitants, speciﬁc events that immediately precede the occurrence of
terrorism.”12 Crenshaw further distinguishes between preconditions that “provide oppor-
tunities for terrorism to happen,” and those that “directly inspire and motivate terrorist
campaigns.”13 This is a crucial distinction, as an opportunity alone is unlikely to lead to
terrorism unless it is matched by amotive for such violence. Structural-level precipitants are
events outside of individuals’ direct control that put a spark to the volatile mixture of
opportunity and motive. While often thought of in terms of excessive use of force by the
authorities, precipitants need not be violent in nature. As later paragraphs will illustrate, the
broadcast of an Islam-critical ﬁlm was a key event for the Hofstadgroup, triggering one
participant to use violence.
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Crenshaw’s distinction between preconditions and precipitants has been used to organize
the most commonly encountered structural-level hypotheses for involvement in
terrorism (Table 1). Clearly, not all of these hypothetical factors are relevant to a
European homegrown jihadist group such as the Hofstadgroup. Absolute poverty, a sudden
marked population growth, or state failure have simply not been characteristics of the
modern-day Netherlands. Neither was the country undergoing a process of urbanization
or modernization, beset by armed conﬂict or social unrest, suddenly exposed to the vagaries
of a globalized economy or aﬀected by “spillover” from regional conﬂicts. Rather than
discuss all of these factors in detail only to conclude their absence or irrelevance, the
discussion limits itself to those that are in theory applicable to the Netherlands and for
which there is at least some empirical support in the data. These have been asterisked.
The Hofstadgroup
The Hofstadgroup was an amorphous group of circa 40 young Dutch Muslims, active
between 2002 and 2005. While participants shared a fundamentalist Salaﬁ interpretation
of Islam, only a hard-core of Salaﬁ-Jihadist extremists believed the use of violence was
justiﬁed and necessary. In 2003, several of them tried to join Islamist insurgents in Chechnya
and Afghanistan. From late 2003 onwards, the focus of some of these extremists shifted
towards carrying out terrorist attacks in the Netherlands. In November 2004, one inner-
circle member murdered ﬁlmmaker Van Gogh for blasphemy. The arrests that followed
crippled the group, but in 2005 its remnants staged a comeback of sorts and became
involved in as many as three potential terrorist plots. One of these appears to have targeted
Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the other explored the possibilities for shooting down an
El Al airliner over Schiphol airport, and the last one targeted the secret service AIVD and
several Dutch politicians. Arrests in July and October prevented these plots moving beyond
tentative planning stages and marked the group’s deﬁnite end.14
The Hofstadgroup is no “quintessential” example of homegrown jihadism.15 However,
the group’s organizational ambiguity and the fact that it proved capable of deadly violence
despite its participants’ lack of (signiﬁcant) paramilitary training or experience, allow
comparisons to be drawn with a subset of European homegrown jihadist groups that
shared these characteristics.16 Furthermore, the similarities between the Hofstadgroup’s
Table 1. Structural explanations for involvement in terrorism.
Preconditions: Enablers Preconditions: Motives Precipitants
The Internet* (Relative) Deprivation* Govt’s excessive use of force
Popular support for terrorism* Intergroup inequality* Government attempts reforms
External assistance* Political grievances*
Social/cultural facilitation of violence* Clash of value systems*
Ineﬀective counterterrorism* Economic globalization
Political opportunity structure* Cultural globalization
Modernization Urbanization
Population growth/youth bulge Modernization
Shifts ethnic/religious balance society Spillover from other conﬂicts
Urbanization State sponsorship of terrorism
Mass media Power structure internat. system
Organized crime—terrorism nexus Failed/failing states
Armed conﬂict
Note. Some factors can function as both enablers and as motivators of involvement and are therefore included under both
headings.
*Hypothetical factors that are in theory applicable to the Netherlands and for which there is at least some empirical
support in the data.
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earliest ambitions to become foreign ﬁghters and the current exodus of young Western
jihadists to Syria and Iraq, as well as the shared ideological outlook, suggest that insights
drawn from this case have relevance for the current iteration of the homegrown threat as
well. Therefore the Hofstadgroup is still a suitable basis for tentative generalizations about
European homegrown jihadism.
Research method and sources
This article assesses how structural factors inﬂuenced participants’ involvement in the
Dutch Hofstadgroup. The authors’ access to large amounts of primary data on the group
makes it tempting to let this material speak for itself. A more structured form of analysis
was chosen in order to maximize the explanatory potential of the material. Those
structural-level factors deemed applicable to the Hofstadgroup case study (Table 1) were
used as analytical lenses through which to study the available data. Thus a theoretically
guided and empirically informed understanding emerged of how structural-level factors
inﬂuenced involvement in the Hofstadgroup.
The data used in this study consist of the Dutch police ﬁles on the Hofstadgroup and
semi-structured interviews with six Dutch government oﬃcials involved in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of this group, as well as ﬁve former Hofstadgroup participants.
Consisting of information gathered through the questioning of suspects and witnesses,
house searches, wiretaps, the contents of suspects’ computers, logs of their online
activities, and a degree of intelligence data, the ﬁles are an extensive and detailed resource
on participants’ behavior and motives. The interviews, particularly those with former
participants, oﬀer unique insights into how and why individuals became involved as
well as a look at the group’s internal functioning.
Both sources need to be critically appraised. One issue with the police ﬁles is their one-sided
perspective, essentially voicing the Dutch authorities’ views onwhat happened. The interviews
with participants are important as a way of balancing this perspective but present issues with
regard to reliability. Both sources are aﬀected by transparency issues, as neither is publicly
available. Where possible, these two primary sources are combined and complemented with
additional information derived from open source articles, media reporting, and government
reports to produce a nuanced, accurate and, where possible, veriﬁable, account. For ethical
and privacy-related reasons, all references to individuals have been anonymized.
Preconditions: Enabling involvement in homegrown jihadism
The preconditions discussed in this section primarily inﬂuence the opportunities for
engaging in terrorism. The qualiﬁcation is important. While the primary contribution of
the factors discussed in this section was to enable involvement in the Hofstadgroup, they
frequently also exerted an (indirect) motivational inﬂuence.
The internet
The Internet can provide opportunities for involvement in terrorism in several ways. It can be
used to gain knowledge about the construction and use of explosives. It can bring together
like-minded individuals regardless of their physical distance from one another and can link
local militants to broader global movements while providing at least a degree of anonymity.17
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The web can also function as an easy-to-use propaganda platform, making a terrorist group’s
message instantly available to a potential audience of millions. By projecting images of war
and injustice across the globe, the Internet allows some of its users to suﬀer vicariously.18 As
such, the Internet can have a crucial inﬂuence on what Egerton calls the construction of a
“political imaginary” in which young Muslims from Western countries establish common
cause with “brothers and sisters” they will most likely never meet.19
All of these functions of the Internet inﬂuenced the Hofstadgroup’s emergence. By
providing easy access to large amounts of information on Islam, jihadist groups, and
geopolitical aﬀairs, the Internet became a key enabler of participants’ adoption of radical
and extremist views.20 Data suggest that for some, the Internet became a source of answers
to questions that parents and imams were unwilling or unable to discuss.21 Does Islam
condone terrorism?What is the cause of the Palestinians’ plight? Why had the United States
and its allies intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq? The web also made available information
of a more practical sort. One participant was found in possession of photographs and maps
of Dutch government buildings and critical infrastructure that he had downloaded,
possibly as part of a reconnaissance of potential targets.22 Several others had downloaded
bomb-making manuals.23
A number of participants met each other online before developing a “real-world”
connection.24 In the fall of 2003, two participants used the web to reach out to other
young Muslims in order to entice them to travel to Pakistan or Afghanistan.25 From the
summer of 2004 until early 2005, one member of the group’s inner circle in particular
utilized online communication tools to instill the “right” interpretation of Islam in some
(aspiring) participants.26 These examples show that the Internet also provided opportu-
nities for the group’s organizational and ideological development and enabled its activities.
Finally, the Internet served as a propaganda tool.27 Participants made and administered
simple websites that expounded extremist interpretations of Islam, advocated the rejection
of democracy, and gloriﬁed terrorism. Such sites also oﬀered practical advice on preparing
for jihad, advertised materials published by participants, in particular Van Gogh’s future
murderer, and threatened the group’s enemies in texts and videos.28
Popular support for terrorism
The importance of popular support for non-state actors who violently challenge a state’s
power has long been recognized in the context of guerrilla warfare and, more recently,
counterinsurgency operations.29 Popular support can be seen as a vital resource for terrorist
and insurgent groups, providing them with the weapons, ﬁnances, recruits, and intelligence
necessary to carry out a prolonged campaign of violence.30 Conversely, when such non-state
actors lose the support of the people they claim to represent, they are frequently unable to
persevere against the materially stronger government forces that hunt them.31
Leiken has claimed that the Hofstadgroup enjoyed far more popular support than
“marginal” terrorist groups such as the Italian Red Brigades (BR) or the German Red
Army Faction (RAF).32 However, these groups could count on substantial support,
especially among students, while there simply is no evidence that the Hofstadgroup was
receiving similar support from the Dutch Muslim community.33 Unlike the BR and RAF,
the Hofstadgroup did not inspire imitation; no follow-up generations of terrorists materi-
alized after the October 2005 arrests. The group’s extremist stance on what constituted
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“true” Islam and the (implied) allegations of apostasy that it leveled against the majority of
(Dutch) Muslims, eﬀectively ruled out the possibility of broad public support.34 The
Hofstadgroup was not a popularly supported vanguard movement ﬁghting for commonly
held grievances, but a fringe group that intimidated its potential supporters almost as
much as it threatened its declared enemies.35
External assistance
External sources of support, whether other terrorist groups, state sponsors, transnational
private support networks, or diasporas that back militancy, can signiﬁcantly increase the
opportunities for engaging in terrorism.36 These parties can make available funding,
weapons, and the opportunity to participate in paramilitary training camps. They can also
provide guidance or even outright operational leadership, thus facilitating preparations for a
terrorist attack.37
The police ﬁles make numerous suggestions that the Hofstadgroup was under some form
of external guidance or enjoyed external assistance. The absence of corroborative evidence
for most of these claims suggests that they should be treated as highly speculative. Examples
include the Dutch intelligence service AIVD’s claim that the Hofstadgroup’s Syrian religious
instructor belonged to a group that “could be seen as a successor or branch of the Bin Laden
organization.”38 Similarly, there is nothing to corroborate the possibility, again raised by the
AIVD, that the group had external donors in Saudi Arabia or among Dutch Muslims who
wanted it to murder politicians critical of Islam.39
The most plausible ties between the Hofstadgroup and foreign extremists came to light
in October 2003. At that time, it became clear that those participants who had traveled to
Pakistan or Afghanistan over the summer were in touch with an unnamed “emir” from
that region, as well as with a Moroccan man in Spain who was suspected of involvement in
the 2003 Casablanca bombings.40 Yet there is no concrete evidence to suggest that these
ties amounted to outside operational guidance. The “emir” most likely tasked the
Hofstadgroup participants in question with convincing other Dutch Muslims to travel
to Pakistan or Afghanistan and the Moroccan man appears to have solicited the group’s
help in order to remain at large.41
It is possible, however, that the two participants who traveled to Pakistan or
Afghanistan underwent some form of paramilitary training there. Not only did one of
the travelers repeatedly claim as much, his use of a hand grenade against the police oﬃcers
who came to arrest him in November 2004 and his utilization of a mirror to observe them
while remaining behind cover, suggest at least some training in the use of weapons.42 In
short, the Hofstadgroup’s emergence was not meaningfully enabled by either external
leadership or support, with the possible exception that up to two of its participants
received rudimentary weapons training while abroad.
Social or cultural facilitation of violence
Individuals exposed to cultural or social values that convey a negative attitude towards
out-groups or glorify violence may be more likely to see the use of terrorism as justiﬁable.-
43 Several empirical studies indicate that Muslims in general are not more likely than non-
Muslims to commit or suﬀer from political violence.44 At the same time, research also
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suggests that fundamentalist and militant interpretations of Islam can inculcate intoler-
ance, hatred, and a positive disposition towards the use of force as a means of dealing with
perceived enemies.45
A 2015 study by Koopmans indicates that fundamentalist views are widespread among
Sunni Muslims in a variety of European countries, including the Netherlands.46 More than
ﬁfty percent of Muslims polled believed that the West was out to destroy Islam, a ﬁgure that
rose to more than seventy percent among “very religious fundamentalist Muslims.”47
Similarly high percentages did not “want homosexuals as friends” and believed that “Jews
cannot be trusted.”48 The data for this particular study were collected in 2008 and across
several countries. However, it seems reasonable to assume that these views did not suddenly
develop and thus that many of the Hofstadgroup’s participants grew up in a social environ-
ment in which similar views were prevalent—all the more so since numerous participants
attended mosques in which the fundamentalist Salaﬁst brand of Islam was preached.49
Reports published in 2004 and 2012 by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research
(SCP) provide further indications of orthodox views among Dutch Muslims. For instance,
30 percent of Moroccan Muslims found that Islam and “modern life” were incompatible.50
A majority of the same group adhered to orthodox interpretations of their faith.51 Both
practicing and non-practicing Muslims held negative views of homosexuality.52 While such
ﬁndings do not directly support Koopmans’ conclusions, by providing indications of the
prevalence of orthodoxy among Dutch Moroccan Muslims, the great importance this group
attached to its Islamic identity and the prevalence of negative attitudes to one of the groups
mentioned in Koopmans’ work, they do lend further credibility to the latter’s study.
This leads to the tentative conclusion that, by instilling a sense of hostility towards the
Western world, social facilitation of fundamentalism likely lowered Hofstadgroup parti-
cipants’ threshold to seeing the use of violence as legitimate. This is anecdotally supported
by the ﬁnding that family members of Van Gogh’s murderer who resided in Morocco,
together with some of the other residents of their village, showed support for the attack.53
Ineﬀective counterterrorism
After Van Gogh’s death, the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security
Services (CTIVD) concluded that the AIVD had incorrectly dismissed the ﬁlmmaker’s
murderer as a peripheral member of the Hofstadgroup.54 Although the AIVD had
possessed information that the future killer fulﬁlled a central role in the Hofstadgroup,
had a history of violent behavior, and was writing increasingly extremist tracts, these data
had not been analyzed in their totality before the murder.55 The CTIVD was careful to
stress that the AIVD did not possess information indicating that Van Gogh’s murderer
was planning to commit an attack.56 Whether extra attention from the AIVD would have
prevented Van Gogh’s killer from striking therefore remains highly speculative. At the
very least, the AIVD’s misdiagnosis beneﬁted the killer by allowing him to carry out his
preparations largely unnoticed.
What clearly did enable Van Gogh’s killer to strike was the fact that his target was easily
accessible. As a public ﬁgure, Van Gogh was easily recognized and because he cycled to his
work in Amsterdam he was also easy to approach. Crucially, he had steadfastly refused the
Dutch authorities’ oﬀer of personal protection following the airing of Submission, part 1 in
August 2004, a controversial and Islam-critical ﬁlm that Van Gogh had directed. By
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contrast, the ﬁlm’s co-creator, Somali-born politician and former Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
had been under round-the-clock protection since November 2002.57 This diﬀerence
probably explains why the killer chose Van Gogh over Hirsi Ali, whose status as an
“apostate” would otherwise have made her the more attractive target.58 Arguably, Van
Gogh’s decision not to accept personal protection provided a larger opportunity for his
killer to strike than the AIVD’s misdiagnosis.
Political opportunity structure
The “political opportunity structure” approach essentially straddles the gap between
preconditions that provide opportunities and those that supply motives for terrorism.59
Adherents of the “strategic school” argue that the openness of democratic societies can
enable violent acts of resistance.60 Institutions such as a free press and an independent
judiciary limit the power of the government over its citizens while basic rights such as
freedom of assembly and the largely unrestricted movement of people and goods make it
easier to prepare acts of violence.61 By contrast, because autocratic regimes lack such
freedoms and suﬀer no restraints on their executive power, the opportunities for engaging
in terrorism are fewer.62
With regard to motive, the “political access school” argues that democracies discourage
terrorism because they provide avenues for the non-violent resolution of conﬂicts and
create opportunities for citizens to pursue policy change without resort to the use of
force.63 Here it is autocratic regimes that are at a disadvantage, as their lack of freedoms,
frequent human rights abuses, and the absence of opportunities for pursuing peaceful
change leave violent opposition as the only option.64 However, there is considerable
empirical evidence that democracies are no less vulnerable to terrorism.65 This may
stem in part from the fact that, while democratic states are less likely to experience
domestic terrorism, their frequently assertive foreign policies increase their exposure to
international terrorism.66
The Hofstadgroup beneﬁted from the democratic freedoms available to it. Arguably it
would have been far more diﬃcult in an authoritarian regime to hold frequent private
meetings, use the Internet to espouse extremist views and attract like-minded individuals,
and to travel abroad to Belgium, Spain, and even Pakistan or Afghanistan. At the same
time, the Dutch authorities did not have to stand idly by. Tempering the opportunities
provided by the Dutch political system was the fact that several group participants were
eﬀectively under AIVD surveillance from mid-2002 onwards. Combined with numerous
rounds of arrests between 2003 and 2005, this proved a considerable impediment to the
group’s ability to function.67
A more concrete conclusion is that access to the political system had little dampening
eﬀect on the Hofstadgroup’s more committed participants’ motivation to use violence.
Initially, some participants appeared to have a modicum of faith in democratic forms of
protest. Two attended rallies; one in support of Palestine in 2002, and one against the Iraq
war in 2003.68 One of these individuals was also temporarily a member of the Arab
European League (AEL) in 2003, but quickly disowned it because “[they] want everything
via democracy.”69 Other participants never even considered such avenues. One interviewee
argued vehemently that the AEL had never held any appeal for himself or the others because
its leader was a Shiite, a denomination they considered heretical and worse than
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unbelievers.70 More generally, the data suggest that the group saw democratic means for
voicing dissent or achieving change as ineﬀective and even illegitimate as it meant working
with and within a man-made democratic system rather than a divinely-inspired one.71
Preconditions: Motivating involvement in homegrown jihadism
Opportunities alone are unlikely to lead to terrorism unless groups or individuals with the
motive to carry out acts of violence make use of them. It is to this second category of
structural-level preconditions that the discussion now turns.
(Relative) deprivation and intergroup inequality
A common-sense assumption frequently voiced by politicians is that poverty and lack of
education are causes of terrorism.72 Scholarship on the issue provides a rather more
nuanced picture. Some studies underwrite this view, ﬁnding that countries experience less
terrorism as they become economically more developed73 and that increased personal
wealth is linked to decreased support for political violence.74 Utilizing opinion polling,
Fair and Shepherd conclude that the moderately poor are more likely to support terrorism.75
Looking speciﬁcally at European homegrown jihadism, Bakker’s study shows that most
individuals in his sample came from a relatively low socioeconomic background.76
Conversely, Piazza ﬁnds no signiﬁcant relationship between low economic development
and terrorism.77 Various scholars posit that terrorists are less likely to come from
impoverished backgrounds than their peers.78 In contrast to the Bakker study, the jihadists
in Sageman’s study mostly enjoyed a relatively well-oﬀ middle-class existence.79 A similar
dichotomy emerges with regard to the relationship between education and terrorism.
Some studies encourage the idea that terrorism attracts the uneducated.80 Others fail to
support such hypotheses or reach diametrically opposed conclusions.81 Given these
conﬂicting ﬁndings, it is unclear whether poverty and lack of education as such can
motivate involvement in terrorism.
Research suggests that deprivation’s ability to contribute to the onset of political
violence is particularly pronounced when it is experienced relative to other individuals
or groups. Gurr deﬁnes relative deprivation as the perceived discrepancy between the
“values” people expect to achieve, such as political inﬂuence or material well-being, and
their actual capacity for doing so.82 When groups perceive that they are unfairly econom-
ically disadvantaged or politically disenfranchised vis-à-vis another class, religious group,
or ethnic minority, relative deprivation can become a powerful motivation for political
action and, potentially, violence.83 Poverty or socioeconomic disadvantages become
markedly more potent motivational preconditions for terrorism when they overlap with
intergroup inequality.84
A 2005 report on the integration ofminorities in theNetherlands indicated that non-Western
immigrants and their children were socioeconomically disadvantaged compared to the
indigenous population. For instance, they had lower educational qualiﬁcations, weremore likely
to be unemployed, earned less income, underperformed at school, and were disproportionally
represented in statistics on crime.85 Another report showed that Dutch Muslims faced
discrimination on the labor market.86 Given the predominance of Dutch Moroccans in the
Hofstadgroup, it is interesting to note that the Moroccan community is frequently cited as
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the one most strongly aﬀected by these problems.87 Researchers have also argued that
the increasingly vituperative debate on Islam and multiculturalism in the Netherlands has
engendered feelings of alienation among (young) Dutch Muslims.88
Relative deprivation therefore seems a plausible motive for the Hofstadgroup’s emergence.
However, there are virtually no indications that income inequality, lack of access to
educational opportunities, political representation, or other tangible examples of intergroup
inequality motivated participants’ involvement in the group or a desire to commit terrorism.
Admittedly, one individual’s involvement began when he failed to obtain an internship
through what he believed was discrimination because of his Moroccan heritage.89 However,
this person was quick to emphasize that this experience did not motivate involvement but
facilitated it. Without an internship to go to this person simply had more time to spend on
other pursuits, one of which turned out to be a growing interest in radical Islam that would
lead towards participation in the group.90
There are several indications of participants experiencing a sense of being second-rate
citizens because of their faith. Take for instance one participant’s reaction to news that a Dutch
prisoner who murdered an Iraqi man was released from jail; “your blood is blood, but our
blood is water.”91 Several encountered (verbal) aggression aimed at their religious convictions
or Moroccan heritage.92 Others spoke out angrily against what they saw as the media’s
unfavorable portrayal of Islam, its tendency to underreport Muslim suﬀering around the
globe, and its viliﬁcation of men like Osama bin-Laden as terrorists.93 In some of his writings,
Van Gogh’s future murderer criticized the Dutch government’s integration policies, which he
saw as attempts to encourage Muslims to abandon their faith.94
Such experiences with discrimination strengthened participants’ convictions and fed
their hatred for unbelievers. But, one potential exception notwithstanding,95 there is little
to suggest that these experiences triggered or motivated involvement or that they were
central to some participants’ planned and perpetrated acts of terrorism. In fact, various
ﬁndings disavow this line of reasoning. Several individuals in and around the group spoke
positively about their experiences as Muslims in the Netherlands and praised the country’s
religious freedom.96 More importantly, although the Dutch “debate on Islam” had been
gaining momentum since the 1990s, it did not really become a topic of conversation
within the group until the release of the Islam-critical ﬁlm Submission in August 2004.97
As one former participant put it, the debate on Islam was “secondary”; while Hirsi Ali and
Van Gogh deserved to be killed, this individual was primarily focused on supporting
Islamist insurgents in places such as Afghanistan.98
It was not discrimination based on ethnicity or religion that motivated the murder of
Van Gogh, but blasphemy. Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali became hated public ﬁgures because
of how they spoke about Islam and its prophet, not because they engendered or exacer-
bated feelings of exclusion from Dutch society.99 Which is not to say that experiences of
exclusion, or feelings of being second-rate citizens did not exert an inﬂuence on the
group’s development. They contributed to the drawing of sharper boundaries
between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in the Netherlands and increased participants’
antagonistic views of the latter. The available data on the Hofstadgroup, however, do not
allow relative deprivation to be ascribed more than such a supportive role when explaining
how its participants became involved.
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Political grievances
The perception that governments or their policies are unjust and lack legitimacy can provide
a powerful impetus for participation in political violence.100 From this perspective, people
turn to terrorism because they see it as a tool they can use to exert political inﬂuence.
The data reveal that numerous participants reacted strongly to armed conﬂicts involving
Muslims. News about the suﬀering of co-religionists in places like Palestine or about
terrorist attacks carried out by Muslims had a range of eﬀects. As vicarious experiences of
injustice and shock, they helped bring about an interest in Islam and geopolitics, triggering
searches for information that contributed to the adoption of radical and extremist
interpretations of Islam.101 As an interviewee recalled his reaction to the 9/11 attacks: “At
ﬁrst you think like ‘terrible, what happened there . . . No religion can justify that.’ So you
investigate. . . . And then I found a fatwa by [Hamoud al-Aqla al-Shuebi] . . . in which he
approved of [the attacks] . . . and I thought it was nice to see how he explained all that and
actually also presented evidence [of its permissibility].”102
These geopolitical events also helped shape a Manichean outlook in which “true” Muslims
were assaulted by both external and internal enemies; principally, the United States, itsWestern-
European allies, Israel, and what participants considered apostate or heretical Muslims.103
Particularly inﬂuential in this regard was theU.S.-led “War on Terror,”whichmany participants
saw as a war against Islam.104 As one wrote, “I gained feelings of hate towards anyone who
supported Bush in his crusade, not just the Netherlands, but also Arabic apostate leaders.”105
Another important eﬀect of these geopolitical grievances was their ability to justify violence by
portraying it as a defensive and righteous response to Muslim suﬀering.106 One of the travelers
to Pakistan/Afghanistan wrote his mother explaining that he had left because the ummah was
under attack; he had gone to help expel the unbelievers from the land of jihad.107
In early 2003, the desire to help Muslims in conﬂict zones led one of the group’s most
committed extremists to attempt to reach Islamist insurgents in Chechnya.108 Later that
year, three others traveled to Pakistan or Afghanistan, likely with a similar purpose in mind.
By late 2003, however, the focus of the Hofstadgroup’s militant core began to shift towards
possible actions within the Netherlands. This transition was partly practical; by this time the
group had clearly attracted the attention of the police and AIVD, making foreign travel
much more diﬃcult. It was also inﬂuenced by political grievances; as a loyal ally of the
United States and Israel, and as a contributor to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
the Dutch government was increasingly seen as sharing responsibility for the harm that
had befallen Muslims and had, to some Hofstadgroup participants, therefore became a
legitimate target.109
It was not just the perception of a global “war against Islam” that motivated participation
in the Hofstadgroup or spurred a desire to utilize political violence. One interviewee stated
that the March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid had demonstrated to him and his colleagues
that terrorism in Europe was both legitimate and eﬀective.110 This event further shifted the
group towards waging jihad at home rather than overseas. In the absence of geopolitical
events involving the perceived victimization of Muslim populations and the violent
responses that this elicited from groups like al-Qaeda, the Hofstadgroup would arguably
not have existed or developed in the way it did. Geopolitically inspired grievances were a key
structural-level factor leading to the Hofstadgroup’s emergence and motivating the violent
intentions of some of its most extremist participants.
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Clash of value systems
Several authors have argued that European homegrown jihadism arose out of a fundamental
incompatibility between radical Islam and liberal democracy.111 It is a line of reasoning that
resembles Huntington’s thesis that the dominant source of post-ColdWar conﬂict would be
“the fault lines between civilizations.”112 The broader literature on political violence is,
however, equivocal on the matter. For instance, while Senechal de la Roche argues that
greater “cultural distance” is positively associated with a higher probability of collective
violence,113 Fearon and Laitin ﬁnd no clear link between ethnic or religious diversity and the
outbreak of civil wars and insurgencies.114
The Hofstadgroup’s radical and extremist views and its participants’ rejection of
democratic laws, values, and institutions certainly made them incompatible with Dutch
liberal democracy. Furthering this divide, many participants did not see themselves as
Dutch.115 This conclusion should be qualiﬁed, however, by the point that these attitudes
do not appear to have motivated involvement in the Hofstadgroup but rather to have
stemmed from it. Prior to their involvement in the group, most participants led apparently
well-integrated lives; attending school, holding (part-time) work, and enjoying recrea-
tional activities like other Dutch citizens their age. Several individuals did not become
practicing Muslims until contact with Hofstadgroup participants led to a reorientation on
their faith.116 Others were converts to Islam. Even among those who had had a religious
upbringing, clear signs of hostility towards Western culture and politics did not manifest
themselves until after they had adopted radical or extremist interpretations of Islam.
These ﬁndings underline the importance of distinguishing between Islam and radical or
extremist interpretations of the religion such as Salaﬁ-Jihadism. The available data provide
little to suggest that the Hofstadgroup was a manifestation of an inherent incompatibility
between Islam and Western democracy. They do, however, show that such an adversarial
relationship developed once radical and extremist views were adopted. This speaks to the
power of the Salaﬁ-Jihadist ideological narrative to instill or sharpen pre-existing in-group/
out-group distinctions and thus lay the basis for intergroup hostility and violence.
Precipitants: Triggering acts of terrorism
Precipitants are “speciﬁc events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism.”117
Given that Van Gogh’s murder was the only terrorist attack to actually be carried out by a
Hofstadgroup participant, can a precipitant event be identiﬁed in the period leading up to
it? It seems highly likely that the killer was triggered by the broadcast of the short ﬁlm
Submission, part 1 on August 29, 2004 on Dutch national television.118 Although Van
Gogh’s assailant never explicitly referred to the ﬁlm in his writings or in court, he chose
to murder its director and he stabbed a note onto his body threatening Hirsi Ali, the
Islam-critical Dutch politician who came up with the idea for the ﬁlm.
Additional, albeit circumstantial, corroboration for this conclusion is that other
Hofstadgroup participants also reacted strongly, if only in words, to the ﬁlm. Death threats
were posted on Hofstadgroup-administered forums,119 at least one individual told
another participant he wanted to see Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh killed because of
Submission,120 and several, while disagreeing with the murder, believed Van Gogh
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essentially had “asked for it.”121 One interviewee claimed that the ﬁlm helped swing the
group’s focus towards waging jihad in the Netherlands.122 Despite the shared antagonism,
however, it was only Van Gogh’s killer who acted.
Conclusion
Numerous hypotheses exist with regard to the roles that structural-level factors can play in
bringing about involvement in terrorism. Reﬂecting a broader problem in the study of
terrorism, however, the majority of these hypotheses have not been assessed for validity
using high-quality empirical data. This article sought to make a contribution toward
remedying this situation by marrying unique and extensive primary-sources based data
with frequently encountered structural-level explanations for involvement in terrorism.
Focusing speciﬁcally on the European homegrown jihadist typology of terrorism, this
article studied how structural-level factors enabled and motivated involvement in the
Dutch Hofstadgroup, and looked at their role in triggering the one successfully executed
terrorist attack undertaken by a group participant.
With regard to facilitation, the role of the Internet was especially important. It exposed
Hofstadgroup participants to geopolitical developments, militant interpretations of Islam,
practical knowledge on the use of weapons and explosives and formed an easy-to-use
communications tool and propaganda platform. Another facilitating factor was the open-
ness of Dutch society, which aﬀorded the group considerable freedom to organize, travel,
and propagate their views. Thirdly, it is likely that growing up in a social environment in
which Islamic fundamentalist views were prevalent lowered at least some participants’
threshold to seeing the use of violence as a legitimate by instilling a sense of out-group
hostility directed at the Western world. Finally, the AIVD’s misdiagnosis of Van Gogh’s
killer as a peripheral group participant and in particular Van Gogh’s refusal to accept
police protection increased the attacker’s opportunities to strike.
Looking at motivational preconditions, geopolitical grievances stand out. Conﬂicts
involving Muslim populations, the U.S.-led “war on terror,” and terrorist attacks such as
those orchestrated on 9/11 had several eﬀects. They triggered searches for answers that
contributed to group participants’ eventual adoption of radical and extremist views,
instilled the conviction that a war against Islam was being waged, and made retaliatory
violence seem both justiﬁed and necessary. Whereas the group’s most militant participants
initially tried to join Islamist insurgents in Chechnya and Afghanistan, the failure of these
attempts and the Dutch contribution to the War on Terror led some of these men to begin
thinking about plotting acts of terrorism at home. Structural factors thus had a hand in
shifting their focus from becoming foreign ﬁghters to conducting terrorism at home.
Perhaps surprisingly, there are no clear indications that socioeconomic inequality, the
harsh tone of the Dutch integration debate, or lack of access to the democratic political
system directly motivated involvement in the Hofstadgroup. Experiences with discrimina-
tion did, however, strengthen participants’ convictions and feed their hatred of unbelievers.
Finally, the precipitant event that likely triggered the one actual terrorist attack to
emerge from the Hofstadgroup, the murder of Theo van Gogh, was the broadcast of the
short Islam-critical ﬁlm Submission.
The structural level of analysis is just one of several perspectives on the factors that can
lead to involvement in terrorism. A comprehensive understanding of how and why people
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become involved in this form of political violence requires incorporating individual- and
group-level explanations as well. Similarly, the Hofstadgroup is just one case among many
belonging to the European homegrown jihadist typology. Achieving a more generalizable
and empirically robust understanding of what drives people to become and remain
involved in terrorism, whatever its particular variety, will require both a broad analytical
perspective and multi-case, comparative research. Key to both approaches is the utilization
of high quality, primary-sources based data so that our assumptions about involvement
processes may ﬁnd a more solid empirical footing.
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